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
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DIA review(s)
completed.


29 August 1966

State Department review completed

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VIETNAM

Just a few notes to bring you up to date on
developments in Vietnam since 
briefing:

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The military situation has changed very little. The allied forces are still keeping the initiative, with major "spoiling operations" which keep the enemy off balance and have so far prevented any major monsoon offensive by the Communists.

These operations have inflicted heavy casualties on the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese troops working with them, but the enemy strength continues to grow, largely through infiltration.

We now estimate that the Communist Main Force amounts to more than 105,000 men, of whom about 45,000 are in regular formations of the North Vietnamese Army. This main force is now organized in 32 regiments, 19 of them PAVN--North Vietnamese, that is. They can operate and have operated in organizations as high as the division level. Our spoiling operations are designed to keep such concentrations from being able to launch

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offensive operations.

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[REDACTED]
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American strength in Vietnam has now ~~exceeded~~ passed 300,000. Other countries---mainly Korea and to a lesser extent Australia--have sent 35,000 men, and South Vietnam has 700,000 men under arms. That adds up to more than 1,000,000 men.

The Communist main force is backed up by something more than 100,000 guerrillas and more than 50,000 support personnel, so that altogether they may have a quarter of a million men. The trouble is that the old textbooks on suppressing guerrillas suggest that as long as you have to defend fixed points and the guerrilla doesn't, you need a superiority of 10 to 1. We have four to one. It may be, however, that our superior mobility and air power will make the difference.

In the North, press accounts recently have given the impression that we are losing many more aircraft. Actually, there has been no significant change in the rate of loss, which compares favorably with both the Korean War and World War II. We have, however, been flying many more sorties as the weather has improved, and attacking more heavily defended targets.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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On the political front, attention right now centers on the election of a constitutional assembly scheduled for two weeks from yesterday--September 11. The campaign has now started, and so has the opposition, from both the Viet Cong and the more militant leaders among the Buddhists.

The Viet Cong are stepping up terrorism, in addition to such obstruction as confiscating voter registration cards. We expect they may resort to considerable violence, including assassination, to disrupt the election itself.

The leaders of the Buddhist Institute have called on their followers to boycott the elections, and we have reports that they may come up with some more devious maneuvers as the election approaches. For one thing, they are said to have a plan to start a rumor on election day that Thich Tri Quang has died, and that all faithful Buddhists should go to the pagodas to mourn him rather than vote.

About 70 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots in provincial and regional elections in May of 1965. There wasn't as much at stake in that election, so there was no active opposition by the Buddhists or the Viet Cong. This time, if as much as 50 percent of the electorate votes, it would be a good psychological victory for the Saigon regime,

for any Saigon government since the early days of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime when Diem had just taken over by plebiscite from Emperor Bao Dai.

Neither the Communists nor the Buddhists want the present regime to be able to claim that kind of public support, and the next two weeks may provide some violent disorders to prevent it.

SAMS

6 Sept 66	FIRED TO DATE	733	FY 66 av 29/mo
			July 192
	AIRCRAFT KILLS	30	3 a/c 2 drone
	confirmed-20		Aug 203
	probable- 10		9 a/c 3 drone
	RATIO	24.4 to 1	
134 sites, est. 20-25 bns			

AIRCRAFT losses total as of yesterday--US 371 over NVN

OB SVN

MAIN FORCE	VC	61,414	(13 rgts)	86 bn
	PAVN	<u>44,900</u>	<u>(19 rgts)</u>	<u>72 bn</u>
		106,314	32 rgt	158 bn
			6 Div HQ	
COMBAT SUPPORT, MF(VC)		17,553		
PARAMILITARY		103,600	----(unconfirmed 16,400)	
UNCONFIRMED:	MAIN FORCE	2,950 VC, 2,500 PAVN		
	PARAMIL	16,400		
ARMED POL CADRE		40,000		

FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

6 September 1966

COMMUNIST FORCES

	CONFIRMED			UNCONFIRMED		PERSONNEL TOTALS
	Combat Personnel	Combat Battalions	Support Personnel	Combat Personnel	Combat Battalions	
MAIN FORCE						
VIET CONG	61,414	86	17,553	2,950	9	81,917
PAVN	44,900	72	---	2,500	9	47,400
Sub Total	106,314	158	17,553	5,450	18	129,317
PARAMILITARY	103,600	below battalion level	40,000	16,400	--	160,000
TOTALS	209,914	158	57,553	21,850	18	289,317

NOTES: More than one half of the 158 confirmed combat battalions listed are now organized into 32 regiments, of which 13 are Viet Cong and 19 are PAVN. In addition, most of these regiments are suspected of being controlled by six division headquarters.

The PAVN personnel listed above are those organized only in the corresponding PAVN units. Those North Vietnamese organized in Viet Cong units are listed as Viet Cong personnel.

The 40,000 paramilitary support personnel are armed political cadres.

ALLIED FORCES

COUNTRY	GROUND FORCE BATTALIONS				AIR SQUADRONS, COMPANIES			PERSONNEL TOTALS
	Infantry	Artillery	Armor, Engineer Other Support		Strike Helicopter	Other		
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM								
Army	157	26	63	--	--	--		280,422
Navy	---	---	---	---	---	---		16,204
Marines	5	---	---	---	---	---		6,870
Air Force	---	---	---	6	4	7		13,906
Paramilitary	---	---	---	---	---	---		388,497
RVN TOTALS	162	26	63	6	4	7		705,899
UNITED STATES								
Army	39	26 2/3	20	--	48	21		185,400
Marines	18	9 1/3	12	8	11	3		55,636*
Air Force	---	---	---	32	---	24		43,104
Navy	---	---	---	16	---	2 1/2		20,628*
Coast Guard	---	---	---	---	---	---		437
US TOTALS	57	36	32	56	59	50 1/2		305,205
OTHER FREE WORLD								

OTHER FREE WORLD TOTAL	10	5 2/3	2 1/3	--	--	--	34,585
ALLIED FORCE TOTAL	229	67 2/3	97 2/3	62	63	57 1/2	1,045,689

*US naval air and marine units afloat are included in unit listings above, but not in personnel total.

Battalion strengths: VC - from 250-700; PAVN - 400-500; ARVN - 350-400; US Army - 800-900 (Airmobile Division--800); USMC - 1,200-1,500.

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best evidence yet obtained that high-level North Vietnamese party and military personalities are serving as the leaders of the Communist political and military apparatus in South Vietnam, has been provided by [redacted] who recently defected to South Vietnamese authorities.

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The defector, who has furnished reliable information on a variety of subjects, was in a position to obtain the information he has provided on the leadership.

He confirmed rumors which have been circulating for more than a year that North Vietnamese politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh is the number one Communist in South Vietnam. Thanh serves as head of both the political and military departments of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), according to the source. COSVN has long been known to be the headquarters for the Communist war effort in South Vietnam.

The source also confirmed that Tran Nam Trung, who is openly listed by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as chief of its military affairs committee, is actually North Vietnamese Brigadier General Tran Van Tra. His true position, according to the source, is deputy commander to Nguyen Chi Thanh. Tra is listed by the North Vietnamese as an alternate member of their party central committee.

The deputy chief of COSVN's political office, according to the defector, is Tran Do who is also listed by the North Vietnamese as an alternate member of their party central committee. The defector also disclosed that the head of COSVN's military operations staff is North Vietnamese General Le Trong Tan. [redacted]

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Chinese Communist Air Order of Battle

The Chinese Communist air order of battle is shown opposite and below.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR ORDER OF BATTLECHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCEJet Fighters

FAGOT/FRESCO	MIG-15/17	1,300
FRESCO "D"	MIG-17D	320
FARMER "A" & "B"	MIG-19	335
FISHBED	MIG-21	35
		1,990

Attack Bombers

BEAST	IL-10	LT/PROP	40
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Bombers

BADGER	TU-16	MED/JET	2
BULL	TU-4	MED/PROP	13
BAT	TU-2	LT/PROP	90
BEAGLE	IL-28	LT/JET	135
			240

Transports

C-46		LT/PROP	28
C-47		LT/PROP	3
CAB	LI-2	LT/PROP	32
COACH	IL-12	LT/PROP	33
CRATE	IL-14	LT/PROP	47
COOT	IL-18	MED/TURBO-PROP	7
COCKPOT	TU-124	MED/JET	2
VISCOUNT		MED/TURBO-PROP	2
COKE	AN-24	LT/TURBO-PROP	2
HOUD	MI-4	HELICOPTER	60
			216

TOTAL 2,486

DIA

1 September 1966

CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL AIR FORCEJet Fighters

FAGOT/FRESCO	MIG-15/17	130
FRESCO "D"	MIG-17D	50
FARMER "A" & "B"	MIG-19	65
		245

Bombers

BAT	TU-2	LT/PROP	10
BEAGLE	IL-28	LT/JET	118
			128

Recon

MARGE	BE-6	TWIN ENG/ FLYING BOAT	5
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Transports

CAN	LI-2	LT/PROP	5
GRACE	IL-14	LT/PROP	16
HOUND	MI-4	HELICOPTER	392

TOTAL

392

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Chinese Communist Air Order of Battle

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CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR ORDER OF BATTLECHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCEJet Fighters

FAGOT/FRESCO	MIG-15/17	1,300
FRESCO "D"	MIG-17D	300
FARMER "A" & "B"	MIG-19	310
FISHBEE	MIG-21	12
		<u>1,922</u>

Attack Bombers

WHAIST	IL-10	LT/PROP	40
--------	-------	---------	----

Bombers

BADGER	TU-16	MED/JET	2
BULL	TU-4	MED/PROP	13
BAT	TU-2	LT/PROP	90
BEAGLE	IL-28	LT/JET	121
			<u>206</u>

Transports

G-46		LT/PROP	28
G-47		LT/PROP	3
CAN	LI-2	LT/PROP	12
COACH	IL-12	LT/PROP	33
CRATE	IL-14	LT/PROP	47
COOT	IL-18	MED/TURBO-PROP	7
COOKPOT	TU-124	MED/JET	2
VISCOUNT		MED/TURBO-PROP	2
CAME	AN-24	LT/TURBO-PROP	7
BOUND	MI-4	HELICOPTER	60
			<u>212</u>

TOTAL 2,440

CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL AIR FORCEJet Fishers

FAGOT/FRESCO	MIG-15/17	130
FRESCO "D"	MIG-17D	50
FARMER "A" & "B"	MIG-19	65
		<u>245</u>

Bombers

BAT	TU-2	LT/PROP	10
BEAGLE	IL-28	LT/JET	118
			<u>128</u>

Recon

MAJDE	BE-6	TWIN ENG/ FLYING BOAT	5
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Transports


CAN	LI-2	LT/PROP	5
CRATE	IL-14	LT/PROP	16
BOUND	MI-4	HELICOPTER	16
			<u>37</u>

TOTAL 394



1 September 1966

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As for the purge which appears to be going on in the Chinese Communist leadership, we are still in the process of determining just exactly what has happened, and what may be coming.

In spite of the still photos and movies of Mao swimming--and the claims which appear to establish that he swims at about three times the world record for the freestyle--we are virtually certain that Mao was a sick man for about six months before his recent reappearance.

We have to postulate just what went on in the top ranks of the leadership at that time, but it must have started them thinking about which one was going to inherit Mao's job.

For years, Mao and five of his closest comrades have formed an inner circle which made every decision for the Chinese Communists.

The titular head of state is Liu Shao-chi, but he is a pretty colorless figure, and it might be hard to endow him with the infallibility and the wisdom the Chinese Reds have attributed to Mao.

Chou En-lai, the Premier, is an able man, but he is considered a government technician, and he has met too many foreigners to please the xenophobic Chinese.

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Marshal Lin Piao is at the top of the military structure, and the youngest man at 58 in the inner circle. We have understood for some time, however, that he has the poorest health of any of the six--

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[REDACTED]
That means that the last two of the top six-- Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen--both had reason to believe that they had a good shot at the top job if anything happened to Mao.

We believe that Teng, who is the head of the Party machinery, took advantage of Mao's illness and a temporary alliance with Lin Piao to get rid of Peng Chen, who has been fired along with a number of Peng's associates and supporters.

There are signs that the purge is not yet over. Mao has taken charge again, and may have his own ideas.

There seems to have been a new alignment of the Politburo, judging from the actions and honors paid to officials at the August 18 rally in Peking.

Lin Piao appeared as second only to Mao. It may be that he is healthier than we think. It might also be that Mao is trying to develop somebody new as a counterweight to Teng. Men in Mao's position would always rather have two presumptive heirs than one, to keep from being toppled prematurely.

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There is little doubt that Mao has approved the mob actions by swarms of young Chinese teen-agers to ~~to~~ push what is called the "cultural revolution." This is intended to revive the enthusiasm of the Communist rank-and-file, and dispose of any officials who might be inclined to moderate policies. It may mean that there are more announcements to come about top officials who have been purged.

Liu Shao-~~Chi~~ dropped way down to eighth place in the rankings, and may perhaps not even be Chief of State any more.

The surprising thing is that two new members who have just been added to the politburo were ranked ahead of Teng Hsiao-ping, who showed up in sixth place, down one from his previous rank.

It is too early to make any final judgments, but it appears that Teng may have overreached himself. He remains, however, General Secretary of the Party, which is still as good a spot as you can find to bid for supreme power.

29 August 1966

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INDONESIA

In Indonesia, President Sukarno and the generals are still sparring, but we may be approaching a showdown.

The generals are still afraid that ousting Sukarno might set off a civil war, but the students who support the new regime are becoming louder and more violent in their demands that Sukarno be sidelined.

Sukarno, on the other hand, is bitter over the settlement of differences with Malaysia and the proposal to return to the United Nations. He was not able to prevent the ~~end of~~ formal end of "confrontation," and the bid to return to the UN is likely to come up on the agenda in the next four to six weeks. So Sukarno, instead of biding his time, is forced to become more and more outspoken in his differences with the generals unless he wants to see his policies completely reversed.

The real problem in Indonesia remains the economic chaos. There is a multilateral international effort under way to help stabilize the Indonesian economy and begin recovery, but the collapse is so complete that there will probably be urgent pleas for bilateral help from the United States.

South Africa: No changes of policy are expected in South Africa from the assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd yesterday.

The apartheid policy of Verwoerd's National Party (NP) was overwhelmingly endorsed by the all-white electorate in the general elections last March. There is little dissension within the NP about that policy except from a small group even further to the right than Verwoerd. Relatively more liberal groups pose no threat to the NP government.

Under South Africa's parliamentary system, a new prime minister will be chosen by a caucus of the ruling political party. The NP is now scheduled to meet at a later date to choose the new prime minister and party leader. The likeliest candidates are Balthazar Vorster (Minister of Justice), Johannes de Klerk (Minister of Interior), Barend Schoeman (Minister of Transport and Railways), and Theophilus Donges (Minister of Finance). Meanwhile an acting prime minister will be appointed today by the party caucus.

Verwoerd's death leaves South Africa, and particularly the Afrikaner community, without a dominant political figure. Until such a personality emerges, the government probably will be run by a collective leadership.

Poland-US: A senior Polish official has expressed strong hope concerning the prospects for improved US-Polish relations.

In an unusually friendly and frank conversation with US Ambassador Gronouski on 1 September, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz emphasized the Foreign Ministry's interest in US friendship. He stressed the importance--while acknowledging the difficulties--of US efforts to improve relations with Poland and with Eastern Europe in general.

Winiewicz' statements on current developments in Southeast Asia, which Gronouski thinks were authorized, included his opinion that the Vietnam war would end in 1967. Winiewicz gave no indication, however, of what prompted this view.

Winiewicz' remarks contrast with the public posture of coolness the regime has maintained toward the US since early 1965, and with its indecisive or adverse reactions to US initiatives since last January. The Poles have blamed the Vietnam war for the deterioration, but internal disputes in Warsaw have also contributed.

Advocates of a hard line in the Polish party have successfully used Vietnam as a pretext for disruption of established relations with the US. Winiewicz' expressed optimism with regard to the future of those relations and his dissociation of Foreign Ministry policymakers from the highly placed hardliners were tinged with a note of caution that it "would be suicide" for him "to buck them." His unusually forthright statements, however, suggest that he felt it necessary at least to counter the deterioration in mutual relations, or that he believes that the proponents of better relations may gain the ascendancy.